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Challenging Carnegie
Kristen Holmquist
“What lawyering skills don’t law schools teach that we should?” I put that
question to a room full of eminent lawyers, judges and mediators who had
come together to serve as the UC Berkeley School of Law Professional Skills
Advisory Board. It is the question that has been on the minds of law teachers
across the country since the 2007 publication of the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching’s report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of Law.1 And the truth is that I expected to hear the same conversation
that I have heard over and over again: Recent graduates know how to “think
like lawyers,” but they lack practical skills; they need more experience writing;
they don’t know how to interview a client, and so on. But the conversation that
developed sounded different, deeper, richer. Rather than focusing on what
tasks recent graduates can or cannot do—which is where much of the legal
education reform talk has centered—these experienced, successful lawyers
talked about how new lawyers do or do not think. Their many suggestions
can be distilled into three main ideas. First, law students need to learn to
recognize the complexity of their clients’ stories and desired outcomes.1 The
clients’ problems may be messy, with difficult-to-determine facts, legal and
nonlegal aspects, and multiple potential outcomes that may differently serve
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1.

William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman,
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 2007) [hereinafter
Educating Lawyers]. Carnegie’s report coincided with calls for change from within the legal
academy and profession itself. The Clinical Legal Education Association and the American
Bar Association, for example, have been loud agitators for change. See, e.g., Roy Stuckey
and Others, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map (CLEA 2007);
American Bar Association Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Legal
Education and Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, Report on the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (American Bar Association,
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 1992) [hereinafter The MacCrate
Report]. These reports and the calls for change that they represent come to many of the
same conclusions as the Carnegie Report. But Carnegie made the biggest splash, and has
come to represent the debate, which is why this essay centers on that document. I recognize,
however, that it is certainly just one cog (if a major one) in this movement.
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one or many of the clients’ goals and aspirations. Second, law students should
acquire a broad historical and contemporary sense of lawyers’ varied roles in
relationship to their clients, within and among institutions, and in society at
large. A lawyer’s ability to move the world closer to her client’s desired endstate is intimately bound up with her ability to understand, and act within,
these institutions and roles. Finally, students need to begin to develop the
confidence and judgment that experience brings. For example, sharp analysis
of the kind rewarded on an exam may suggest three lines of argument, but
judgment might lead a lawyer to decide that her client’s stated goals are better
served by pursuing only one or two of them. Time and again the discussion
around the table turned to the interplay of experience, analysis, understanding,
and application—all in service of creating lawyers “who will contribute to the
public good and who will serve their clients effectively and ethically.”2
The Carnegie Report drew attention to legal education’s open secret: Law
school only half-heartedly and rather incompletely prepares students for the
practice of law. This observation is far from new. In 1933, Jerome Frank famously
called for transforming “law schools” into “lawyer schools.”3 During the 1950s
that call was renewed.4 Later, while critical legal theorists objected to typical
law teaching as much on theoretical as professional grounds, they too noted
the scant attention law school has paid to lawyering.5 The 1970s and 1980s
further saw clinical educators and those interested in problem-based teaching
argue that the case method focuses too heavily on judge-centered thinking,
and that law school ought to do more to expose students to lawyers’ roles and
2.

Legal Education Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN), General Description of Planned
Projects, 2009–2010, at 8, available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/ display/images/dynamic/
events_media/LEARN_030509_lr.pdf. LEARN is a consortium of ten law schools (CUNY
Law School, Georgetown Law School, Harvard Law School, Indiana University School
of Law (Bloomington), New York University School of Law, Southwestern Law School,
Stanford Law School, University of Dayton School of Law, University of New Mexico
Law School, and Vanderbilt University Law School) that came together in the wake of the
Carnegie Report in an effort to promote “innovation in law school curriculum, pedagogy
and assessment.” Id. at 10.

3.

Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933). Frank was
certainly not the only person during this era to raise questions about legal education’s nearexclusive reliance on the case method. See, e.g., John Dickinson, Legal Education and the
Law School Curriculum, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 424 (1931), Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush:
On Our Law and Its Study (1930) (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).

4.

See, e.g., Joseph Walter Bingham, Law Schools and the Future, 6 J. Legal Educ. 486
(1953); Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for
this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 1 (2000); Robert W. Gordon, The
Geologic Strata of Law School Curriculum, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 352 (2007) (describing the
history of major curricular reforms); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism At Yale, 1927–1960 (The
Lawbook Exchange 1986) (describing the theories behind legal realism and its effects on
legal education).

5.

See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. Legal
Educ. 591 (NYU Press 1982). Richard Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
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thinking processes.6 With time, each iteration of this standard complaint either
faded or found itself cabined into marginal positions within the academy, yet
it has never truly disappeared.7 With publication of the Carnegie Report, we
find ourselves, once again, in the middle of another change moment.
Because of the report’s prominent place within the current reform
movement, it is crucial to understand how it has framed the debate, and the
limits imposed by that framing. In many ways, the report reflects and gives
credence to the prevailing narrative about law school: Legal education is
quite good at, but overly dwells in, the intellectual sphere. Law professors, the
report suggests, excel at teaching case analysis, and the case method effectively
immerses first-year students in lawyerly thinking. But, the authors find that
instructors over-rely on the case method and standard doctrinal classes to the
exclusion of teaching students how to engage in the day-to-day practice of
law. As a result, students graduate without knowing how to act like lawyers. In
order to remedy this deficiency, Carnegie calls for more and better-integrated
practical and professional instruction into an otherwise highly successful
intellectual program.8 Many of the post-Carnegie changes have focused on

6.

See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Report of the Committee on Educational Planning and
Development (1982); Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections
on Clinical Methodology, in Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility,
Clinical Education for the Law Student: Legal Education in a Service Setting 374–375
(Meilen Press 1973); David A. Binder & Susan A. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling:
A Client-Centered Approach (West 1977); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education
—A 21st Century Experience, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984).

7.

Critiques of, and attempts to reform, legal education come from many stakeholders and
many directions within the academy. In addition to the arguments cited above (and myriad
others), see, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 515 (2007),
David Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping
the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1981 (1993), Todd D. Rakoff &
Martha L. Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 597 (2007), Angela
P. Harris & Marjorie Shultz, A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward Civic Virtue in
Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1773 (1993), Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting
Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43 (1991); Laura
Kalman, To Hell with Langdell, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 771 (1995).

8.

While the report generally praises legal education’s work in the cognitive or intellectual
sphere, it is very critical of the way we assess students’ progress. See Educating Lawyers, supra
note 1, at 162–184.
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integrating more skills training into the curriculum.9 Drafting, interviewing
and negotiating are stand-alone courses at more and more schools,10 and
exercises on these subjects occasionally find their way into doctrinal courses.
This essay challenges Carnegie’s conclusion that law school successfully
teaches students to think like lawyers. The report’s stress on the distinction
between thinking and doing belies the inter-relatedness of understanding,
experience, evaluating and creating. As a result, it defines “thinking like a
lawyer” downward to encompass only the sharp, non-value-based doctrinal
analysis and application in which law school so thoroughly immerses its
students. This definition, however, is not consistent with fuller accounts of
law and lawyering. Empirical analyses and lawyering theories recognize
the recursive nature of knowledge and experience in a way that broadens
our understanding of what it means to think like a lawyer. Again, not one
lawyer around the table that morning in Berkeley said “students do not write
persuasive briefs” or “new lawyers do not know how to draft an effective
contract.” Instead, they signaled that new lawyers struggle with thinking in
deeply contextual and sophisticated ways about how they might—or might
not—use the law to help a client solve her problem.
I suggest that the problem with law school is not insufficient practical
training in the midst of successful intellectual education. It is true that the
short shrift that law school gives to most experiential or applied learning11 is
9.

In truth, it is unclear just how much curriculum reform has actually occurred. While
reform talk fills the air, it appears to me that change on the ground has been positive,
but marginal. In May 2009, the Institute for Law Teaching and Learning published the
results of a nationwide survey on legal education reform in light of the Carnegie and Best
Practices reports. This survey shows that a number of schools have adopted a new course
or two. Many schools now require a single “skills” course for graduation or have added
interviewing and counseling or negotiation elements to the first-year legal writing courses.
I label these changes positive because they expand students’ learning opportunities. I
call them marginal because, at all but a few schools, they represent only a tiny portion
of a law student’s coursework. The norm even at change-leader LEARN schools remains
the same: a schedule heavily weighted toward doctrinal classes taught through the case
method, relying on edited appellate cases and viewing the world through a judge’s eyes. See,
Institute for Law Teaching and Learning, available at http://lawteaching.org/publications/
ILTLchartoflegaleducationreform200905. pdf.

10.

This stand-alone model is not consistent with Carnegie’s proposed changes. The report
calls for an integrated model—single courses that teach both doctrine and skills. Educating
Lawyers, supra note 1, at 191–92.

11.

I first adopted the use of the term “applied learning” after meeting with Deborah Cantrell
of the University of Colorado at Boulder School of Law. The term seems to best capture
the deeper learning that comes only through experience. “The concept of applied learning
is often equated to ‘hands on’ or practical learning experiences. However, since the 1990’s
[sic] when increased attention was given to the links between education, training and
the ‘world of work’ a broader definition of applied learning has emerged. This broader
definition advocates an approach which contextualized learning in a way which empowers
and motivates students, while assisting them to develop key skills and knowledge required
for employment, further education and active participation in their communities.” Lyn
Harrison, What is Applied Learning?: Exploring Understandings of Applied Learning

Challenging Carnegie

357

problematic on a practical level, as Carnegie makes clear, because students
graduate from a professional school largely unprepared for day-to-day practice.
But law school may fall short in an even more fundamental way. Our pedagogy
and curriculum—an over-reliance on neatly edited cases to the exclusion of
working with messy, human facts, in ways that real lawyers might—obscures
the inter-dependence of knowing and doing that is at the heart of thinking
like a lawyer. It obscures the context and content that lawyers work within
while, together with their clients, solving problems. Students’ lack of applied
learning opportunities may deny them the ability to write a fantastic brief.
But the narrow focus on case-method learning may also deny students the
opportunity to engage in sophisticated higher-order thinking about law and
policy, problems, and goals, and about potential paths, obstructions, and
solutions.
Four years have passed since the Carnegie Report’s publication.12 I propose
that we stop for a moment to take stock and ask whether we are headed in the
right direction. In Section I of this essay I suggest that the Carnegie Report’s
sometimes complex assessment of law school has been distilled into overly
formalistic and largely unhelpful categories. Section II posits that this frame,
the Carnegie diagnosis and prescription, substantively misses the mark. It is
not true that we do a particularly good job of teaching students to “think like
lawyers,” at least not in the richest sense. Carnegie’s claim is made possible
by artificially separating thinking from doing, and thereby too narrowly
defining what it means to think like a lawyer. In support of these assertions,
Section III examines empirical and theoretical lawyering literatures that blend
experience with knowledge to broaden our understanding of what it means to
think like a lawyer. While but starting places, these literatures may provide a
springboard to the rich conversation about curricular reform that is missing
from the Carnegie Report. It is this discussion, I believe, that is crucial to any
long-lasting and fundamental curricular change. Finally, Section IV begins to
explore the kinds of curricular changes to which this conversation might lead
us. The lawyering literatures discussed in Section III treat lawyering as but a
version of the more general skills of human problem solving and persuasion.
If this view is right, then what law school is missing is a conceptual framework
for understanding these processes.”

Amongst Beginning Teachers, available at http://www.aare.edu.au/ 06pap/har06844.pdf.
12.

It is certainly true that much of the current push for reform predates the Carnegie Report’s
publication. See supra note 1. I rely on the Carnegie Report as an organizing principle in
this essay for two reasons. First, its approach strikes me as representative of at least major
components of many of these other change loci. Second, the report has sufficiently captured
the imagination of many in legal education, including those who might otherwise not have
caught wind of the reform conversation, that it is now central to the debate.
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I. The Carnegie Report On the Status of Legal Education
The Carnegie Report was published as part of a series on professional
education more broadly. The Carnegie Foundation set out to assess the state
of professional education (including medicine, nursing, engineering, and
clergy training), identify potential shortcomings, and offer suggestions for
improvement. Each report relies on a common model. Professional education
can be broken down into three apprenticeships of learning: the cognitive
(which “focuses the student on the knowledge and way of thinking of the
profession”); the practical (which exposes students to the “forms of expert
practice shared by competent practitioners”); and the apprenticeship of
identity (which “introduces students to the purposes and attitudes that are
guided by the values for which the professional community is responsible”). In
the law school context, the cognitive apprenticeship is where a student learns
to think like a lawyer, and the apprenticeship of practice, as described by
the Carnegie authors, is where one learns to act like a lawyer.13 The Carnegie
Report suggests that legal education currently focuses almost exclusively on
the cognitive apprenticeship. It finds that law school successfully teaches
students the conceptual pieces of lawyering, but neglects the apprenticeships
of practice and identity. In order to remedy this deficiency, the report
recommends integrating simulated and actual lawyering responsibilities into
the doctrinal curriculum.
A Look at the Case Method
While the current shape and approach of law school is a well-worn and
entirely familiar topic, it is worth looking at it through the Carnegie authors’
eyes in order to better understand their reform proposals. Carnegie claims
that the vast majority of the law school curriculum works in the cognitive
sphere. “Of the three, it is the cognitive apprenticeship most at home in the
university context because it embodies that institution’s great investment in
quality of analytical reasoning, argument, and research.”14 It further asserts
that the meat of this cognitive training is found in the case method and the
doctrinal classroom. While the report takes for granted curricular divisions
along doctrinal subject matters, it does spend time exploring the way we
communicate that doctrine through the case method and Socratic-like
dialogue.
The report’s attitude toward the case method largely tracks conventional
wisdom. The case method, especially as deployed during the first year of
law school, effectively and quickly transfers a massive amount of substantive
13.

The report likewise claims that students are given inadequate schooling in the values and
identify of the profession. Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 126–161. While I tend not
to talk about the apprenticeship of identity in this essay, I do believe that my proposals
would likewise go a long way toward teaching students to think about their roles and
responsibilities as professionals.

14.

Id. at 28.
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knowledge to students, and perhaps more important, markedly shifts their
habits of thought and argumentation. The report commends the case method
as “a potent form of learning-by-doing”15 and calls it “well suited to train
students in the analytical thinking required for success in law school and
legal practice.”16 It defines lawyerly thinking as the ability to distill facts and
problems into “the clarity and precision of legal procedure and doctrine and
then to take strategic action through legal argument in order to advance
a client’s cause before a court or in a negotiation.”17 And it is this process,
narrowing and then framing the relevant facts in legally cognizable ways, that
(especially first-year) doctrinal courses successfully teach.
But the report goes on to suggest three significant problems with legal
education’s near-exclusive reliance on teaching through appellate cases. The
first of these echoes the lawyers’ concerns explored at the beginning of this
essay. The task of connecting the analytical process “with the rich complexity
of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people, let alone the job of
thinking through the social consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusions,
remains outside the case-dialogue method. Issues such as social needs or
matters of justice involved in cases do get attention in some case-dialogue
classrooms, but these issues are almost always treated as addenda. Being told
repeatedly that such matters fall, as they do, outside the precise and orderly
legal landscape, students often conclude that they are secondary to what really
counts for success in law school—and in legal practice.”18
The second and third unforeseen consequences of legal pedagogy’s
repeated reliance on case-method learning lie at the core of Carnegie’s critique
of legal education. Students graduate with insufficient knowledge about what
lawyers do on a daily basis, and even less experience doing any of it. Law
school, the report notes, pays only “casual attention to teaching students
how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual law practice,”19 which
leads students to believe that “lawyers are more like competitive scholars than
attorneys engaged with the problems of clients.”20 The report acknowledges
that most law schools do offer courses in lawyering skills: courses like research
and writing, trial advocacy, and negotiation. But they are typically taught by
low status, nontenure-track faculty, frequently assumed by students to be less

15.

Id. at 74. This is an interesting example of recognizing that it is the “doing” that leads to the learning
(what the education literature calls transfer). See, e.g, How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience,
and School 39–66 (Nat’l Academy Press 1999) (a review of the learning literature on transfer).
But it is a limited version—the doing that is important in the cognitive apprenticeship
all takes place through the class method as practiced in a doctrinal classroom.

16.

Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 75.

17.

Id. at 54.

18.

Id. at 187.

19.

Id. at 188.

20.

Id.
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rigorous and intellectual than their doctrinal courses,21 and do not make up
a very large fraction of the curriculum. Legal education’s lack of seriousness
with respect to teaching lawyering skills causes students to graduate with but
the faintest sense of how to perform the practical stuff of lawyering. According
to the report, this lack of rigorous practical training is a major, perhaps the
major, shortcoming of law school as we know it.22
The final consequence of the over-reliance on the case method, as identified
by the report, is a failure “to complement the focus on skill in legal analysis
with effective support for developing the ethical and social dimensions of the
profession.”23 The report notes that, while of course teachers’ and schools’
practices vary, questions of ethics are only lightly addressed in most law school
courses. The big questions about the ethics of lawyering are reserved for an
independent legal ethics class. And then, rather than engaging students as
moral actors and future professionals, legal ethics classes tend to be taught
as yet another case-method doctrinal course: this time the law of lawyering.
Legal education, Carnegie claims, lacks sufficient opportunities for wouldbe lawyers to explore the moral, social, cultural and ethical boundaries and
effects of the law and lawyering.
Diagnosis and Prescription
Consistent with the report’s initial organizing principle, the authors
conclude their assessment of the current state of legal education by placing its
strengths and weaknesses into each of the three apprenticeships, or categories.
As Judith Welch Wegner, one of the Carnegie authors, later put it,
The first ‘cognitive’ apprenticeship focuses on developing students’ thinking
skills in the specific context of legal materials and law-related content. It has
both a knowledge context and an epistemological character. In short, students
must learn ‘what counts’ by way of knowledge, and how to construct knowledge
for themselves within this particular field. The ‘cognitive’ apprenticeship fits
exceptionally well with the ‘case-dialogue method’ and with legal education’s
place in the academy. Not surprisingly, the Carnegie Report found that legal
education handles the cognitive apprenticeship very well.24

21.

Id. at 88.

22.

See, e.g., id. at 190. Likewise, the post-Carnegie literature has particularly stressed the failure
of law schools to include much practical training. See, e.g., Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing
Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,” 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 867, 888 (2009).

23.

Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 188.

24.

Wegner, supra note 22, at 887.
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The lack of attention to solving clients’ problems is deemed a deficiency
in the practical apprenticeship, and legal education’s insufficient attention to
the ethical and social dimensions of lawyering suggests a problem with the
professional apprenticeship. Note, however, that these diagnoses represent
an almost-immediate backtracking, or simplification, of Carnegie’s more
complex statements of law schools’ imperfections. The relevant section of the
report began by suggesting that the case method as taught in doctrinal classes
limited students’ ability to think about problems in complex factual and
ethical ways. But that idea was virtually abandoned once the authors set out to
think about strengths and weaknesses along the lines of the apprenticeships.
Legal education fails to teach students how to “do and act” rather than how to
“know and think.”25 Whether intentional or not, the simplified version fits far
more neatly into the apprenticeship model, and this simplified problem leads
to a too-simple solution.
In order to remedy the deficiencies in the practical and professional
apprenticeships, the report calls on law schools to offer a three-part, integrated
curriculum. The report itself offers few concrete examples of what these
courses, especially after the first year, might look like, but over the years a
kind of consensus Carnegie-based reform agenda has emerged.26 In courses
throughout the curriculum (maybe eventually most law school offerings, or at
least most doctrinal offerings), traditional analytic training would be paired
with practical training—on interviewing, counseling, negotiating, or writing a
complaint or brief, for example—to give students a better feel for what it means
25.

Id. I don’t mean to accuse the Carnegie authors of not understanding the relationship
between doing and thinking or the recursive nature of the two. In fact, Wegner goes on to
say that “legal education has not really embraced the need for students to learn to ‘do and
act’ or appreciated the ways in which ‘doing and acting’ are powerful means to fuel learning
of substance itself.” Id. Nonetheless, their use of separate thinking and doing categories
necessarily simplifies the conversation.

26.

See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1271, 1271
(2010) (coming to many of the same conclusions on the “segregated” view of legal education
in the Carnegie Report that this essay does); Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in
Hard Times: the Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. Legal
Educ. 598, 611–612 (2010); Stephen Gerst & Gerald Hess, Professional Skills and Values in
Legal Education: The GPS Method, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 513, 518 (2009); Leah M. Christensen,
Enhancing Law School Success: A Study of Goal Orientations, Academic Achievement and
the Declining Self-Efficacy of our Law Students, 33 L. Psy. Rev 57, 83 n. 151 (2009), Kate
Nace Day & Russell G. Murphy, “Just Trying to be Human in this Place”: Storytelling and
Film in the First-Year Law School Classroom, 39 Stetson L. Rev. 247, 257 (2009); Jonathan
Todres, Beyond the Case Method: Teaching Transactional Law Skills in the Classroom, 37
J.L. Med. & Ethics 375 (2009).
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to deploy the legal principles they learn in practice. Ideally, the experiences
would build on one another until a student had actual responsibility for live
clients.27
II. Carnegie’s Diagnosis, and Therefore its Prescription,
is Misdirected
Carnegie’s stress on the distinction between the cognitive and the
practical is a mistake because it belies the inter-relatedness of understanding,
experience, evaluating and creating. The separate cognitive and practical
categories are inconsistent with most everything we know about how people
learn. Higher-order thinking skills come only after repeated opportunities to
apply memorized and then understood information.28 The Carnegie authors
knew this29 and they took pains to occasionally blur the lines between the
categories in nuanced ways. It is the distinct categories themselves, however,
that have carried the day.30 In lawyering terms, the Carnegie categories suggest
27.

Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 195. Influenced by Carnegie’s report, as well as by
and other documents critical of modern legal education, Washington and Lee University
School of Law recently adopted a third-year curriculum that does in fact blend doctrine and
practice. See Washington and Lee’s New Third Year Reform, http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear/.
As of today, this innovation might come closest to the Carnegie prescription in practice.
See posting of Peter Joy to Best Practices for Legal Education, http://bestpracticeslegaled.
albanylawblogs.org/2008/03/07/washington-and-lee-embarks-on-a-new-third-yearcurriculum-embraces-the-carnegie-report-and-best-practices/ (Mar. 7, 2008). “‘Everyone in
legal education is closely following the noble experiment in experiential learning for thirdyear law students being introduced this year at Washington and Lee,’ says Judith Welch
Wegner, Burton Craige Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina and co-author,
Educating Lawyers. ‘The innovative approach developed at W&L will provide students with
important education in thinking, doing, and understanding professional roles. The school is
to be commended for this exciting innovation.’” See Newswise.com, http://www.newswise.
com/articles/washington-and-lee-revamps-third-year-law-curriculum.

28.

The most concise statement of this principle is known as Bloom’s Taxonomy. It arranges
the six major categories that make up the development of intellectual skills into a pyramid.
Knowledge forms the base, with comprehension on top of that, then, application, analysis,
synthesis, and finally evaluation sits at the top of the pyramid. Each category must be
mastered before a learner can move on to the next. In other words, knowledge and
comprehension cannot lead to synthesis and evaluation without engaging in—mastering
even—application. Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I:
The Cognitive Domain. (Addison Wesley Pub. 1984). The learning literature also discusses
the concept of “transfer.” See, e.g, How People Learn, supra note 15, at 39–66 (explaining
the process of transferring specific content knowledge to more generalized analytic and
evaluative knowledge through the process of application).

29.

Several among them are prominent teacher-educators and education scholars.

30.

The power of these categories is hardly surprising. First, they resonate with colloquial
understandings of the ways in which thinking and doing are separate things. Second, they
provide convenient heuristics for thinking about legal education going forward. Instead of
remembering the complexity and fluidity of learning and lawyering, the categories allow us
to conveniently file the report’s descriptions and prescriptions into places full of pre-existing
meaning and content. The fact that the categories resonate, the fact that they are meaningful
to the average reader, makes it easy for that reader to impose order, through schemas or
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that law schools owe their students the opportunity not only to learn to think
like lawyers, but also to act like them. Yet this cognitive/practical divide is as
untenable in lawyering as it is in learning. Is writing a motion for summary
judgment in a multi-million-dollar copyright matter a cognitive skill, or
a practical one? And imagine deposing a scientist employee of a corporate
defendant in an environmental matter. Imagine further that the scientist is
both reluctant and knowledgeable. Is it a cognitive task or a practical one to
elicit useful information from him?
The result of these formal categories is to define “thinking like a lawyer”
downward, limiting it to a decontextualized doctrinal analysis and application.
This version looks more like law-as-puzzle than a serious attempt to solve
complex human (or corporate) problems. It certainly does not reflect the more
complex view of legal practice that lawyers or lawyering theorists recognize.
This essay explores just two accounts that incorporate the iterative relationship
between learned content and reflected experience in a way that broadens the
definition of what it means to “think like a lawyer.” If, as these literatures
assert, law is a manifestation of more general social and cultural forces, and
lawyering is but a version of human problem solving and persuasion, then
thinking like a lawyer is far more multi-faceted and content-laden than the
doctrinal analysis and application most first-year law students master and
Carnegie congratulates.
Re-Entangling the Conceptual Pieces of Learning and Lawyering
Education research makes clear the iterative nature of learning: One acquires
content knowledge, “uses” that content in relevant ways, and thereby gains
a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the original learned content.31
To be sure, the report nods toward this more complex and recursive view of
learning (and lawyering). For example, it recognizes the case method as a form
of learning by doing. Students do not simply read about legal analysis, but
learn to do it through the question-and-answer process in class.32 And as law
teachers we tend to believe that students become much better legal thinkers
and arguers for having had to test the arguments and construct the doctrinal
boundaries themselves.33 But rather than allowing this view to complicate its
stock stories about those categories; see infra text accompanying notes 50–56. For a fuller
exploration of the interrelation of categories and schema, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1103, 1133–1139 (2003); Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow & George
A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (Transaction Pub. 1956); George Lakoff, Women, Fire and
Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Univ. of Chicago Press 1987).
31.

See, e.g., supra note 28.

32.

They get even further hands-on opportunities to learn legal analysis through research and
writing in their first-year lawyering classes.

33.

This was certainly the conceit of Christopher Langdell. He might not have said
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diagnosis of legal education, the report consistently retreats into its cleaner,
distinct categories. By dividing practical from cognitive, doing from thinking,
the report avoids asking how lack of experience with “using” legal doctrine in
messy, real-world-like situations denies students an opportunity to engage in
higher-order lawyerly thinking.34
An example might be helpful here. A first-year student35 in a contracts
class reads a set of cases about the legal consequences of bargaining process
defects. Among those readings are cases on mistake that ask “when does a
misunderstanding by one or both contracting parties render the contract void
or voidable?” Imagine one case asserts that “O was injured in an accident at
work. The employer’s insurance company admitted liability and requested that
O enter the hospital for tests on the extent of his injuries. At the conclusion
of the hospital stay and after evaluating the doctor’s report, the insurance
company offered O $40,000 in full settlement of any and all claims under the
policy. O accepted the offer and signed a release which, among other things,
stated that it was a ‘general release of all claims for personal injuries, known or
unknown.’ Later, O became seriously ill due to an internal trauma undetected
in the medical examination. O claims that the release should be set aside
for mutual mistake.”36 The students in class will debate, analogizing to the
cases they have read thus far, whether the later illness was covered by the “all
“experiential”or “learning by doing”—but he did envision the case method as something like
the scientific method. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and
What to Do About It, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 610, 630–635 (2007); Christopher Langdell, Harvard
Celebration Speeches, 3 Law Q. Rev. 123, 124 (1887); Davis, supra note 26, at 1275-1282.
34.

My concern is not simply one of semantics, an attempt to sneak practical education into
law school by relying on different language. While skills courses and clinics unquestionably
enhance a law student’s learning, and ought to be a larger part of most law students’ law
school experience, my concern here is a slightly different one. As I describe later in this essay,
recognizing the recursive relationship between learned content and experience might lead
us to a broader understanding of what it means to think like a lawyer, and to an across-theboard curriculum that better reflected those many ways of thinking. This is not to say that
the semantics of cognitive versus practical do not cause their own problems. While it is true
that financial and structural limitations will hinder any attempt to rethink legal education,
Carnegie’s cognitive/practical dichotomy makes it even more difficult by playing into an
educational hierarchy that privileges thinking over doing and ideas over actions. To the
extent that academics equate practical with anti-intellectual (or at least “not intellectual”),
Carnegie offers little incentive to change the way we teach. Practical training may be good,
it may be important—the thinking goes—but it is not at the center of the scholarly enterprise.

35.

And here it might be worth thinking about who the typical first-year student is. While there
is of course a huge variation, the average age of incoming law students hovers between 24
and 26. The median student in Berkeley Law’s class of 2013 was 25 at the start of his 1L
year. This means that a large percentage of any 1L class will be students without much life
experience with things like complex business transactions or workplace discrimination or
the myriad other “problems” that casebooks confront.

36.

Ian Ayres & Richard E. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law, (Foundation Press 2008) 511
(suggesting that students compare Obaitan v. State Farm, No. 14318, 1997 WL 208959 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 17, 1997), with Gortney v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 549 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996)).
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claims for personal injuries, known or unknown” or whether the incomplete
and inaccurate medical examination constituted a mistake that undermines
the contract. The students will argue about which “blameless party should
assume the loss,” and whether O’s agreeing to release “known or unknown”
claims shifts the balance of equities on the assumption of loss. And these are
of course important pieces of lawyerly thinking here.
But an expert lawyer, one actually trying to work with her client, O, to help
resolve the problems of high medical bills, loss of income, physical suffering
(maybe problems of defaulting on loans, inability to pay for his child’s
schooling, maybe…) will also need to think about much more. Experience
with interviewing and deposing might lead her to ask questions that effectively
get at how mistakes like this happen, whether either the insurance company
or O had reason to believe that undetected medical problems might still be
lurking. Experience with interrogatories and document requests might lead
her to garner empirical evidence about how often such releases are signed
when a prior examination should have uncovered an ongoing injury or illness.
Experience with personal injury plaintiffs might help her listen to her client
in a way that uncovers multiple—and maybe even competing—goals, which in
turn could affect the type of resolution she and her client pursue. Especially
important for academic purposes, all of these experiences and the information
and knowledge that come with them might lead her to reassess the mistake
doctrine and the policy goals that support it. And almost none of that process
or substance will be systematically uncovered in a first-year contracts class.
As the example shows, the result of drawing artificial boundaries between
the cognitive and the practical is to limit what it means to think like a lawyer
in a way that allows the report to say that legal education succeeds in the
cognitive sphere, when it could be said that our pedagogy “sharpen[s] the mind
by narrowing it.”37 The case method, repeated over and over again, sacrifices
complexity for precision, and as it stands, there is no systematic method for
folding cultural, factual, contextual or procedural complexity back into the
discussion. To be sure, this simplified approach reinforces students’ analytical
abilities. We do successfully teach students to engage in fine distinctions of
fact and language; to sort the legally relevant from less relevant; to cogently
argue for a particular solution of a legal problem; and then to flip that analysis
on its head and just as cogently argue its converse.38 The daily work of the
doctrinal classroom makes quick work of turning neophytes into something
like experts at this narrower kind of lawyerly thinking. But it does so at a
37.

LEARN, supra note 2, at 7, quoting Edmund Burke.

38.

“The ability to think like a lawyer emerges as the ability to translate messy situations
into the clarity and precision of legal procedure and doctrine and then to take strategic
action through legal argument in order to advance a client’s cause before a court or in a
negotiation.” Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 54.
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cost. By narrowing students’ thinking this way, we diminish students’ ability
to think about the knotty relationship among facts and culture and clients and
law.
III. Broadening the Definition of “Thinking Like a Lawyer”
Law teachers tend to think it is important that their students learn this
narrow form of thinking; but at their best, legal educators strive not just
to graduate sharp debaters, but to prepare lawyers who will “contribute to
the public good and serve their clients effectively and ethically.”39 In recent
decades, multiple lines of scholarship have reflected on just what that means:
What is it that lawyers do? How do they go about doing it? What makes
one lawyer better, more effective than another? The Carnegie Report either
ignored or marginalized these literatures, and yet they may offer an important
springboard for understanding what it means to think like a lawyer in its fullest
sense, and what law schools might teach in order to better prepare effective,
ethical, contributing lawyers.
For the purposes of this essay, I highlight just two different approaches
to better understanding lawyering and lawyerly thinking, though there are
certainly other options one could explore. Let me be clear: I do not purport
to have “the answer” for improving legal education. In fact, I think that any
proposed fix will be premature prior to a sustained dialogue around some
fundamental threshold questions: Why law school? What do we hope to
teach our students during their three years with us? What are our educational
objectives? I offer these two literatures as starting places for several reasons.
First, each resonates with the skills identified by the lawyers at the beginning
of this piece. Second, neither diminishes the importance of the rigorous legal
analysis that we have come to identify as central to legal education, but each
also incorporates many other facets of lawyering. And third, each has room
for the iterative relationship between learning and doing, knowledge and
experience.
An Empirical Analysis: What do Lawyers think Lawyers Do?
The first approach I describe is an empirical analysis of effective lawyering
by Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck. In “Identification, Development, and
Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering,” Shultz and Zedeck aimed
to identify testing methods that when “combined with the LSAT and Index
Score, would enable law schools to select better prospective lawyers based on
both academic and professional capacities, thus improving the profession’s
performance in society and the justice system.”40 In order to predict effective
lawyering, Shultz and Zedeck first set out to define it. Through hundreds
39.

LEARN, supra note 2, at 8.

40.

Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Final Report: Identification, Development, and
Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering 2 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1353554.
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of interviews with lawyers, they identified twenty-six “Effectiveness Factors”
related to competent lawyering. These factors were defined and redefined
through an elaborate psychometric process designed to produce “fixable,
relevant, and practical” assessment standards for each of these factors.41 At
the end of the process, Shultz and Zedeck had a range of behavioral examples
for each factor that lawyers were asked to assess in terms of the “level of
effectiveness” it showed.42 The multiple illustrations of any given factor, when
taken together, might be understood as defining that factor.43
While their ultimate goal is to develop or identify predictors of attorney
competence useful to law school admissions,44 I believe their list of
effectiveness factors could also help better define what it means to practice law.
Shultz and Zedeck break down lawyering attributes and learning objectives
into finer, more concrete descriptions. Recognizing the individuality of one’s
client—understanding the complex interaction of her story, the law, and her
needs—is captured in many of the effectiveness factors as is a lawyer’s need to
understand her role within institutions and society. Judgment and wisdom are
also expressed throughout the list.
None of these competencies can be understood as separate from the rest or
from the analysis and reasoning skills currently at the heart of our definition
of “thinking like a lawyer.” Rather, they interrelate, inform, even define one
another. Their interaction shapes the “thinking of a lawyer” beyond the
narrow, hyper-analytical definition on which both the report and law school
itself tends to rely.
Educators who hope to rely on these effectiveness characteristics to reform
legal curriculum and pedagogy must explore both “what” and “how.” What
would a student need to know to become a competent lawyer under this
fuller definition? What does it mean to teach creativity? Problem-solving?
Judgment? Influencing and advocating? And, second, how might we go about
teaching these competencies?45
41.

Id. at 15–16.

42.

Id.

43.

The twenty-six effectiveness factors Shultz and Zedeck identified are: analysis and reasoning,
creativity/innovation, problem solving, practical judgment, researching the law, fact finding,
questioning and interviewing, influencing and advocating, writing, speaking, listening,
strategic planning, organizing and managing one’s own work, organizing and managing
others (staff/colleagues), negotiation skills, ability to see the world through the eyes of
others, networking and business development, providing advice and counsel and building
relationships with clients, developing relationships within the legal profession, evaluation,
development, and mentoring, passion and engagement, diligence, integrity/honesty, stress
management, community involvement and service, self-development.

44.

These effectiveness factors ought to be interesting to state bar examiners as well as law
schools. To the extent that these are the competencies that lawyers tell us are essential to
effective lawyering, they might well be worked into our professional licensing exam.

45.

While I focus on just this empirical account of lawyering in this essay, multiple ongoing
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Shultz and Zedeck’s empirical work in part answers these “what” questions
with descriptions of effective models of each competency. Theoretical work
across disciplines, including the lawyering-as-problem-solving literature
discussed below, has likewise explored many of them. Part of any robust reform
conversation will have to be an attempt to flesh out lawyering competencies
and attributes with an eye toward determining what content must be folded
into the law school curriculum. Later in this essay I briefly lay out my view of
what curricular and pedagogical changes might move us toward embracing
this fuller definition of lawyering.
A Theoretical Take: Lawyering As Problem Solving
Psychology also offers insights into what it means to lawyer, how one moves
from novice to expert, and how we might think about setting students on a
path toward excellence. A body of literature has emerged from these insights
that focuses on lawyering as problem solving.46 The Carnegie Report cites
this literature to develop “a theory for teaching practice,”47 but only to remedy
the perceived lack of intellectual heft behind practice-oriented courses. The
report’s reliance on psychology there is actually an interesting example of the
way its categories get in the way. Carnegie limits cognitive psychology to a
theory that supports practical training, when the truth is that it is capable
of much more work than that. Indeed it is a theory that many have argued
comfortably encompasses the doctrinal and analytic aspects of lawyering as
well. By treating psychology’s relationship to lawyering as a “practice” theory,
Carnegie effectively limits the lessons we might draw from the field.48
Cognitive psychologists define a problem, simply, as any situation in which
the current state of affairs varies from the desired end point. And solving that
problem entails a series of decisions and actions, each building on the last,

conversations on legal education have similarly considered and debated law school’s
emphasis on combative argumentation to the exclusion of other important lawyering
skills and styles. See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-solvers: Connecting
Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 Duke J. Gender
L. & Pol’y 119 (1997); Austin Sarat, supra note 7; Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching
Professional Judgment, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1994); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, supra note
7.
46.

This literature also finds antecedents in and resonates with similar explorations in
anthropology, linguistics and literary theory, among other fields of study.

47.

Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 100.

48.

Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions Of Theory, 45 J. Legal Educ. 313, 329 (1995) (“Lawyers are, of course, not the
only professionals concerned with making decisions and solving problems: those processes
are at the core of every profession. In the legal academy however, such matters are generally
relegated to the ‘art of practice, of which the less said the better.”).
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in order to move the world closer to the goal state.49 In order to make these
decisions, or encourage others to, we rely on stock stories, or schemas, familiar
stories and arguments that act as heuristics and allow us to create meaning
through narrative.50
Individuals develop mental databases of stock stories through experiences
direct and indirect, individual and cultural. These stock stories become
categorizing and ordering tools. When one encounters people, things, events,
or ideas that share features with a stored schema, the mind overlays the
schema’s narrative onto the new objects, events or ideas to create meaning of
them. Indulge me, for a moment, with an example. Imagine you see a person
with a camera standing out in front of a church, and nearby are a woman in
a white dress and a man in a tuxedo. You likely instantly draw on all of the
weddings that you have been to (or seen in movies or read about in books)
that have melded together in your mind as the story of “wedding” and you
think, “They just got married, and are having their wedding photos taken.
They’ll be off to their reception in a moment where they will dance, visit with
their guests, eat if they have time to, cut a cake and throw a bouquet. After that
they’re off on a honeymoon. How lovely.” You could be wrong; they might be
models taking photos, or maybe they were just married, but they won’t have a
reception. Each of these possibilities, or many others, could be true. But most
of us would glance at the trio, apply our notion of “wedding” to the story, and
thereby create meaning out of the sight of three people in front of the church.
As we move from novice to experts in any given area, we become better at
sorting relevant from irrelevant features for classifying purposes. We develop
this refined sorting ability through reflective trial and error. The better we get
at sifting very relevant features from the less relevant, the more helpful our
schema (or categories) are at helping us assess incoming information. In order
to see how this works, we can return to the above scenario: The woman in
the white dress holds a bottle of water in one hand and flowers in another.
There is another man holding a camera. A few feet away, children kick a soccer
ball around. Now imagine that instead of your adult, wedding-expert walking
down the street it is you as a child. You have not been to a wedding, and
you have not watched romantic comedies with the obligatory happy-ending
wedding. When you walk by, you will still try to make sense of what you are
seeing, but you have less expertise available to sort the more-relevant from the
49.

Id. at 331.

50.

Id. at 334 (“Simon and Newell suggested that the number of possible paths could be reduced
to manageable size through the application of heuristic principles to the search process.
Instead of searching all possible solution paths, an intelligent problem-solver would utilize
heuristics, like subgoaling. Put simply, if we compare the current state to the goal state and
determine that there are no legal operators available at present to narrow the difference
between the two we can establish the ‘subgoal’ of getting to a state where such operators can
be utilitized.”) (citing Allen Newell & Herbert Simon, Human Problem Solving (Prentice
Hall 1972)).
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less-relevant facts. So, you might wonder why a soccer game is being held in
front of a building instead of at a park. And won’t the white dress get dirty
if the woman plays? And is the water for her flowers or to drink? Or maybe
for the children to drink when they finish playing? Because you are a child,
you are accustomed to someone taking pictures of everything that you do, so
you do not even notice the camera. Once you develop expertise on weddings,
you might notice the children and the water bottle but they would not factor
in as relevant to your assessment of what was going on. You would focus
immediately on white dress, tuxedo, flowers, and camera. Together, those data
points lead inexorably to a story about a wedding.
Our stock stories, of course, depend on our experiences—both as individuals
and as members of a culture. Perhaps you have been to so many weddings that
you cannot help but think wedding when you see an elegant white dress. But
your friend, with whom you are walking down the street, recently attended
her cousin’s quinceañera. She sees a beautiful gown and a photographer and
immediately overlays a story not about a wedding, but of the quinceañera. You
may be relying too heavily on some facts to create a story; perhaps she is
ignoring others. But both of you are fitting the people you see on the street
into pre-existing narratives that help you make sense of it. And this all happens
in a moment.51
Not only do our stock stories allow us to make sense of our world, they
also help us make choices, and persuade others to do the same. These past
experiences suggest the efficacy of one path and the risks of another. They
help us frame the problem, evaluate potential solution paths, and decide on a
course of action.
The same cognitive and cultural processes lie at the heart of every form of
specialized problem solving, including lawyering.52 Lawyers rely on legal and
cultural stocks in order to try to move the world in directions that benefit their
clients. This movement involves persuasion of one form or another—whether
it’s persuading a court to find for one’s client, an opposing party in litigation to
see one’s settlement offer as a good deal, or a collaborative party to undertake
some kind of a joint venture.53 The question of how to persuade through
51.

For a detailed examination of this model of problem solving in an every-day circumstance,
see Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1984).

52.

The point is not that experts—here, expert lawyers—are better appliers of stock stories.
A skilled lawyer would fare no better at solving a cooking problem, say, than would a
nonlawyer. But within their fields of expertise, experts’ experience appears to allow them
to better organize their knowledge. Experts use this organization, and the concomitant ease
of heuristic retrieval, to build better problem representations—leading to, hopefully, better
solutions. Blasi, supra note 48, at 335.

53.

See Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind 309–331 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 2001); López, supra note 51, at 2–3; Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner,
Minding the Law 110–43 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000).
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stocks in a legal context involves understanding empirical, instrumental, and
normative questions.54 On the most obvious level, legal precedent serves this
function. But lawyering involves appealing to stories and arguments that
are relevant and persuasive for larger empirical, cultural, and social reasons
as well. Law is not an organic thing unto itself, but a reflection of broader
cultural and social forces and understandings (mentally represented through
stocks).55 Effective lawyering must appeal to these broader forces and stories.
And effective lawyers persuade by understanding and manipulating the stocks
of the relevant arbiter.56
Like the Shultz and Zedeck work, this problem-solving model leads to
a broader and richer definition of “thinking like a lawyer,” one that reflects
everyday human processing and persuading and is infused with real-world
content rather than the crisp yet flattened stories of edited appellate opinions.57
And, similar to the Shultz and Zedeck work, this model leads educators to
two sets of questions. First, what would a rich inventory of stock lawyering
stories look like; and second, how might we help our students build it in ways
that enables them to progress toward, eventually, expert status? With respect
to the first question, today’s typical curriculum focuses almost exclusively
on building a database full of complex doctrinal concepts applied to various
(presented-as-true) factual situations. By graduation, students have built a
mental library of potentially thousands of difficult doctrinal rules, standards
and theories, and of available methods for applying them, from a judge’s point
of view, to a set of presented facts. And these stocks are crucial analytical tools.
They tell the stories and arguments of law,58 and begin to set the boundaries of
legally cognizable analysis.59 What is missing is the context and its empirical,
instrumental, and normative content. The recent graduate’s mental library
largely lacks stock stories that help her assess how, and in what institutions,
and by relying on what methods, she might—or might not—use the law to help
54.

López, supra note 51, at 2.

55.

See generally Winter, supra note 53; Chen & Hanson, supra note 30 (all discussing the cultural,
social, and cognitive underpinnings of legal structures).

56.

All these ideas have found voice in the lawyering scholarship generally for decades. But
for some of the most thorough expressions of the cognitive structure behind lawyering,
see generally López, supra note 51; Blasi, supra note 48; Winter, supra note 53; Amsterdam &
Bruner, supra note 53; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L Rev. 1161
(1995); Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar Conventional Again, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1607
(2001).

57.

See, e.g., Gerald P. López, Changing Systems, Changing Ourselves, 12 Harv. Lat. L. Rev. 15,
20–22 (2009).

58.

Amsterdam & Bruner, supra note 53, at 54–110.

59.

For one viewpoint on the essence of legally cognizable structures, see Duncan Kennedy,
A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse L. Rev.75 (1991). See also Jeremy Paul, The
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1779 (1991); Jack Balkin, The Promise of Legal
Semiotics, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1831 (1991).
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a client solve his problem. A curriculum geared toward this view of lawyering
must address this lack of context and content, asking, what are lawyers’ stories?
And what might a lawyer need to know about how to frame and manipulate
them in order to serve her client?
The second question presented by this framework is, how does one build
the organized library of stock stories and arguments, problem framings and
solution paths that precede good judgment and assist in bringing about
welcome outcomes? The answer, in short, is experience. An expert, quipped
physicist Niels Bohr, is one “who has made all the mistakes that can be made
in a very narrow field.”60 And there is some truth in the statement. Experience
alone is not sufficient, of course,61 and a novice will necessarily interpret
her experience through her inventory of stock stories and arguments. But
experience working with, recognizing, and defining problems, deploying
legal arguments and tools while partnering with a client in order to resolve
those problems, acting in the various roles and institutions a lawyer might
position herself—experience of this sort is fundamental to gaining expertise.62
Some of this experience will, and must be, direct. Lots of it, especially in the
beginning, will be through simulation and analogy.63 Legal problem-solving
skills, in other words, can be learned in the classroom as well outside of it, so
long as the classroom is designed to give students experiential chunks and
60.

Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide 51 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2009).

61.

Blasi supra note 48, at 355; Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment,
69 Wash. L. Rev. 527, 543–549 (1994).

62.

Again, experience is necessary, but not sufficient, for consciously building problem-solving
skills. That experience must be, first, of the sort that develops the relevant and useful
lawyering stock stories contemplated above. The classroom-based experiences should be
designed with an eye toward building the lawyering database. Second, effective classroomprovided experience will be paired with guided reflective opportunities. Experience can
either provide a path toward expertise, or be thoughtless repetition of the same successes
and the same mistakes. Students who learn how to learn from experience while in school
stand a better chance to become life-long learners, beyond graduation. Briefly, the reflective
steps that turn experiences, both the successful and the missteps, into expertise-building
blocks include: “having a goal and evaluation criterion [for each experience]; obtain[ing]
feedback that is accurate, diagnostic, and reasonably timely; and review[ing] experiences to
derive new insights and learn from mistakes.” These steps seem obvious, but it turns out that
cognitive and psychological barriers make them difficult to take. We engage in hindsight
bias, exaggerating our confidence that a series of steps would lead to a particular outcome,
when of course we had no such confidence when we embarked. We fail to get the necessary
feedback, or we dismiss it and rationalize it rather than learn from it. We generalize from
too little data, or fail to generalize from sufficient data. We selectively observe data—noticing
it when it confirms our hypotheses, failing to see it when it might tend to disprove our
thinking. All of these risks must be attended to when teaching students how to learn from
experience. Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 811,
816 (1999) (citing Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions 17 (1999)).
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See Blasi, supra note 48, at 355.
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to help them develop the “habits of thought inherent in the formal model
[that] improves subsequent problem solving done at the naturalistic end of
the spectrum.”64
IV. Curricular and Pedagogical Implications
Drawing from just these two accounts of lawyering, it seems clear that
legal education as currently configured teaches a rather anemic version of
“thinking like a lawyer.” I accept the conventional wisdom that for many, if
not most, students, “the first-year experience typically results in a remarkable
transformation: a diverse class of beginners somehow jumps from puzzlement
to familiarity, if not ease, with the peculiar intricacies of legal discourse.”65
But again, this ease, or at least familiarity, is with a narrow form of thinking.
We provide students with the basics: the ability to learn, analyze, and make
elementary arguments about and from doctrine and policy. But we come
nowhere close to providing them with the richness of knowledge or appliedlearning opportunities (actual or simulated) necessary to move beyond novice
legal problem-solver status or to develop more than a few of the competencies
of an effective lawyer. In short, law school does good work with what it does,
but it does not truly teach students to think like lawyers.
If I am right that current legal education artificially narrows our definition
of lawyerly thinking, then our reform goals might look toward fattening it
back up. What exactly the fattening process should look like will necessarily
vary across institutions with myriad interests and constraints. But here I
propose some ways that this more capacious understanding of the conceptual
piece of lawyering might translate into curriculum and pedagogy. If law is a
manifestation of larger social and cultural forces, and if lawyering is a version
of human problem solving and persuasion accomplished through a whole
constellation of competencies, then what law school is missing is a sense of
context that allows students to flesh out and conceptualize those systems. First,
I propose that we infuse our curriculum with factual, empirical and normative
content far beyond that which can be gleaned from appellate cases. In fact, my
suggestions might be understood as moving legal education closer to a liberal
arts education (rather than further away, as many, rightly or wrongly, view the
Carnegie proposals). Second, I believe that legal curriculum ought to expose
would-be lawyers to the cognitive processes that inform the persuasion and
decision-making central to lawyering. Finally, I propose that, at least in part,
we shift our pedagogy to give students more experience with understanding
legal problems from the ground up. So much has happened in a case—lawyers
and clients and judges have already made so many decisions—before it ever
reaches the phase of an appellate opinion. Moreover, and perhaps more
64.

Brest & Krieger, supra note 62, at 827–28.

65.

Educating Lawyers, supra note 1, at 47.
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important, most lawyering will never lead to an appellate opinion. We might
develop new pedagogies that expose students to these many other forms of
lawyering.66
Lawyers’ (and Clients’) Stories
Because much of legal education segregates “reasoning and analyzing”
from the rest of lawyerly thinking, and then elevates it as the sine qua non of
lawyering, students often believe that the elegance of the argument is more
relevant than the real-world content that animates that argument. In order
to remedy this, student learning must move beyond heavily edited appellate
opinions to include real-world stocks about complex human and social facts.
For decades, scholars have acknowledged the richness gained by viewing
the law and legal processes through lenses of other disciplines—economics,
sociology, psychology, literary theory, and more. This same richness brought
to the classroom stands to add context to and strengthen a student’s
understanding of what it means to think like a lawyer. Just how we might
accomplish this will almost certainly vary from subject to subject, and class to
class. One might imagine that in some subject areas we would want students
to take entire threshold courses. Tax students, for instance, might take courses
that provide a working knowledge of accounting or behavioral economics. Yet
in other areas it may be enough to work contextualizing material directly into
individual courses. A business associations professor might lay a foundation
in finance or the organizational psychology research on corporate governance.
Legal arguments about corporate boards, for example, cannot help but sound
different when the students have a sense of how board members behave and
whether they are actually likely to provide rigorous oversight. In criminal
law, one might introduce sociological analyses on the intersection of criminal
law, race, and poverty. Students might feel differently about the policy goals
of punishment if they understand the different ways in which divergent
communities are policed.
Content and context add dimension not only to substantive law and
arguments, but to lawyering processes as well. Lawyers are not, of course,
autonomous decision-makers and problem solvers. They work, instead, with
clients and within and among institutions. Yet, whatever knowledge students
gain about working with clients, or the form and function and cultures of legal
institutions, is mostly haphazard, slipped into lectures during the first year,
or into a skills course or two. Law students do not tend to be systematically
exposed to the institutions in which they will practice. Nor do they learn
much about the value of or theories behind collaborative work.67 These are
66.

My proposals in this essay are not so very different, in the end, from Jerome Frank’s in 1933.
See Frank, supra note 3, at 918–20. Plus ça change…

67.

Some of the work on collaborative lawyering includes: Lucie E. White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 Clinical L. Rev.
157 (1994), Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 Clinical L. Rev 427
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further areas in which we could easily do a much better job. For instance,
the first year might include a foundational course on American legal systems.
Courses connected to clinics (or simulated work) might explore the history
of legal institutions or the role of the lawyer in modern society, or they might
prompt students to think seriously about how to collaborate with clients and
other relevant community members. These, of course, are but examples. And
many good teachers, I am certain, already incorporate multidisciplinary,
contextualizing readings and lectures into the classroom to better prepare
their students to think about their subject matter as a lawyer would. But we
ought to undertake a serious inquiry into how we might methodically work
context and content into the classroom to deepen students’ thinking about
the law and lawyering both within a subject area and in relationship to clients
and institutions.
Decisionmaking and Storytelling with Imperfect Information
If my first curricular proposal involves determining the type of content that
lawyers might understand and manipulate when solving a problem, the second
deals with insufficient content or lack of relevant information. How do lawyers
go about making decisions or helping clients make decisions when they do
not know everything they might like to about a problem? In addition to
learning methods for acquiring knowledge (legal research, fact investigation,
effective uses of discovery, and interviewing techniques, for example) students
might be exposed to the psychology around decisionmaking. Students (and
thus lawyers) who understood cognitive biases,68 for example, might frame
their argument differently; they might choose one narrative over another; or
they might push for an outcome that looks different than they would have
otherwise.69 “The promise of cognitive theory lies precisely in its ability to
make explicit the unconscious criteria and cognitive operations that structure
and constitute our judgment. It is by laying bare these cognitive structures
and their impact on our reasoning that we can best aid legal actors—whether
advocates or decisionmakers—who wish to understand the law better so that
they can act more effectively.”70

(2000); Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 Clinical L.
Rev. 541 (2006); Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering (Westview Press 1992).
68.

For a detailed look at cognitive biases, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 1489, 1497–1527 (2004); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2
The Handbook of Social Psychology 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. Oxford Univ.
Press 1998); Margaret Shih, Todd L. Pittinsky & Nalini Ambady, Stereotype Susceptibility:
Identity Salience and Shifts in Qualitative Performance, 10 Psychol. Sci. 80 (1999).

69.

See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 Md. L.
Rev. 213, 215–217 (1991).

70.

See Winter, supra note 53, at xiii.
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For example, a lawyer advising a client on whether to accept a settlement
offer will influence the client’s response “by myriad judgments, conscious or
not, about what information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize,
and what style and phrasing to adopt.”71 If he is cognizant of these effects, “if
he consciously understands the process that governs our decisionmaking,”72 he
will be a more effective advisor. A lawyer may believe that it is not his role to
influence a client’s judgment, but do so unwittingly if he does not know what
to look for, how to think about his client’s decision-making process. Or he may
believe that he should educate his client as fully as possible, including about
the decision-making process itself, in order to smooth his client’s own path
toward a decision.73 All of this suggests that law students would be well-served
by exposure to the cognitive structures of persuading and decisionmaking.
Experience
Finally, I propose that we allow students to experience much more of
lawyerly thinking than they currently do in the doctrinal classroom. Both the
cognitive psychology literature and our own experience tell us that students
learn best when they get their hands dirty. Law teachers know this, in part,
because of the case method. Most of us believe that one learns legal analysis
by engaging in guided legal analysis from the first day of classes.74 But law
students get little chance to experience the legal thinking that might occur
at stages other than appellate litigation. They seldom experience the conflict
of competing goals—some of which may be legal, some of which may not be.
Appellate cases do not give students the opportunity to make out a story of
“what happened” or, “what is likely to happen if.” Law students get few chances
to think about unknowable motivations (of opposing parties, collaborating
parties, arbiters.) They rarely have the opportunity to rethink an argument or
goal given previously unearthed information.

71.

Simon, supra note 69, at 217.

72.

López, supra note 51, at 10.

73.

Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look
at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 77, 113–124.

74.

While law students may have little sustained opportunity to experience lawyering in role—
and to develop the higher order analytical, problem-solving skills that might follow—they
almost universally encounter repetition and first-hand experience as a teaching tool. See
Blasi, supra note 48, at 359 (“[W]e do not expect first-year law students to ferret out the
concept of ‘consideration’ or ‘speech’ from reading a single case in a casebook. And our
resistance to pleas of ‘just give us the rules’ springs from a sense of how people learn, rather
than mere sadism. It is the active process of comparing and contrasting appellate cases
dealing with complex concepts that leads to an understanding of those concepts on a level
deeper than one can get to from the propositional exposition of the hornbook or course
outline. Langdell’s ‘legal science’ stands on firm ground in human cognition and learning,
at least insofar as lawyering entails understanding doctrinal concepts and applying them in
new situations, with one qualification: even in learning from written cases, what one learns
is affected by perspective.”).
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Well-run clinics certainly provide these invaluable experiences to our
students. As it stands, however, clinical units merely supplement the steady
diet of case-method and doctrinal courses.75 Some reformers have argued that
we alter the ratio of classroom learning to clinical learning by transforming
the third year of law school into a clinical year,76 thereby providing students
with the kind of experiential training that would put them on the path toward
expertise. And, were a clinical year to come on the heels of a first- and secondyear curriculum that recognized and taught the fuller version of thinking like a
lawyer that I lay out above, I, too, would favor of such a transformation.77 But
this is an incredibly expensive proposition, and strikes me as very unlikely at
most schools in the near future.78
Expanded clinics, however, are not the only way to provide students with a
variety of experiential opportunities. Many of the forms, or stages, of lawyerly
thinking might be incorporated into the classroom. Again, there are options,
from the time-intensive complete revamping of materials and syllabus, to
the much more modest task of rethinking what types of questions one asks.
Among the major changes a teacher might choose is a more inclusive notion of
the case method, one that leans less heavily on appellate opinions and spends
more time building a case from the beginning stages. Students would read case
files that included client interviews, information elicited through discovery,
and a series of cases that function as controlling and persuasive authority.79
75.

The number of clinical units a student takes, or can take, of course varies tremendously
across individuals and institutions. But even if a student spends an entire semester engaged
in clinical work (which is on the high side) rather than classroom work, it still makes up
but one sixth of his education, with the remainder likely heavily tilted toward traditional
doctrinal analysis.
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The new Washington and Lee third year, see supra note 27, is an experiment along these lines.
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My personal bias is that expanded clinics would be beneficial not only to student learning,
but would be important steps toward increased community engagement by students and
faculty alike.

78.

The primary obstacle is financial. The case method allows for very high teacher-to-student
ratios—far higher than other graduate school models. Faculty-to-student ratios in law schools
range from about 7.7:1 at Yale, to 14:1 at University of Missouri and beyond. Many schools
hover in the 11–14:1 range. For comparison purposes, my school, the University of California
at Berkeley School of Law claims a ratio of 11.4:1 (a number that includes part-time faculty
who tend to teach very small classes and get paid only a nominal amount), whereas the ratio
in UC Berkeley School of Engineering’s Ph.D. program is 5.7:1; University of California at
San Francisco’s medical school (Berkeley does not have a medical school) boasts a 3:1 ratio.
US News & World Report 2011, available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.
com/best-graduate-schools. These high ratios show financial benefits for both law schools
themselves and the universities they are a part of.
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This model might look much more like the Harvard Business School case method. This
method, to be sure, is not without its detractors. And I do not mean to suggest that it, alone,
should completely supplant our current pedagogy. But as one of a series of pedagogical
tools, this fuller case method might provide students with a variety of experiences and
intellectual challenges. Harvard Law School has experimented with a version of this method
in its relatively new course, the Problem Solving Workshop. Elaine McArdcle, Beyond
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Or case files could set students up to think through transactional processes,
providing a nice counterbalance to legal education’s current litigation-heavy
curriculum.80
Even smaller steps would enhance students’ lawyerly thinking. Teachers
might rely heavily on a casebook, but work one or two ongoing cases file into
the course. Or they might rely wholly on a casebook but consistently work
the lawyer’s point of view into the classroom discussion. Teachers should ask
questions like: Why might the lawyer have framed the question this way?
Why do you think the client chose to pursue this? Would you have advised
the client to do differently? Questions as simple as these help students to see
the material slightly differently, to understand that hundreds or thousands of
decisions were made about the case long before an appellate opinion was ever
issued. And with that, especially when combined with the added context and
content described above, students begin to understand that there is more to
thinking like a lawyer than doctrinal analysis.
V. Conclusion
While this essay begins to stake out a point of view on the direction that
legal education might move, my preliminary goal is simply to call for dialogue.
Does the current movement for greater infusion of practical and professional
skills into our current curriculum best address what ails law school?
In the end, the Carnegie Report, and the scholarship that has followed
on its heels, does not go as far as it could in identifying the problems in legal
education. By accepting the conventional wisdom on lawyerly thinking, it
stops short of seriously articulating a conceptual and empirical framework for
what it means to lawyer. The empirical evidence presented here shows that the
heavy emphasis on detached doctrinal analysis seriously undersells the kind
of thinking that lawyers believe they need to master in order to effectively
work on behalf of their clients. And problem-solving theory weaves context,
content and process to present a complex picture of the cognitive structure
inherent in lawyering. Were we as law teachers (and interested members of
the community) to engage these visions of lawyering, we might find ourselves
better prepared to ask: Why law school? What is lawyering? What do we hope
to teach students during their three years with us? And if we began there, from
informed first principles, I believe that our discussions around reform would
both sound different and produce better outcomes.
the Case Method: A First-Of-Its-Kind Problem-Solving Workshop Prepares 1Ls for The
Realities of Law Practice, Harvard Law Bulletin 4 (Summer 2010). This course picks up
where an earlier Harvard Law School creation, The Bridge, left off. See http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/bridge/.
80.

In a smaller course, students could use a lawyer’s tools to elicit some of this information:
interviewing the client themselves, drafting briefs or memoranda, negotiating with partners
to the deal. But even a large course could use this method without the simulated pieces
by the students. The case files would then simply provide the context for the classroom
discussion.

